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CaseNo.20040939-CA

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of possession of a controlled
substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) & (c)
(West 2004); one count of unlawful possession of imitation controlled substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (West 2004); and one count of
possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5837a-5 (West 2004).
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did instructing the jury that "the State must eliminate all reasonable doubt" violate
defendant's due process rights?

"Whether [a jury] instruction correctly states the law is reviewable under a correction
of error standard, with no particular deference given to the trial court's ruling." State v.
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted).
2.

By stipulating that he had a prior conviction for drug possession, did defendant

invite any error by the court in relying upon that judgment?
This Court will not review "an error committed at trial when [the appellant] led the
trial court into committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) & (c) (West 2004), Prohibited acts—Penalties
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use
a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless
it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from
a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;...
(c) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 7 September 2004, defendant was charged by amended information with one count
of possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004);1 one count of unlawful possession of imitation

'Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(c) (West 2004), defendant's prior
conviction for possession enhanced the current charge from a third degree felony to a second
degree felony.
2

controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4
(West 2004); and one count of possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). R.26-27.
After a one-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. R.123. Defendant
was sentenced to the statutory terms. R. 125-26. He timely appealed. R.130.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On the afternoon of 1 March 2004, Jeff Abrams gave his co-worker, defendant, a ride
home from work. R.141:61, 122. When they were about "150 yards" from defendant's
parents' house, defendant saw Officer Eberling of the Monticello City Police Department and
Agent Clark, defendant's parole officer, waiting for him. R. 141:122. Defendant became
concerned. R141:135. Defendant's "heart was beating fast." Id. Jeff "caught a glimpse of
[defendant] bending over," and it appeared to him that defendant was "shoving some stuff
under . . . the chair." R. 141:62.
When Jeff stopped the truck in front of the house, defendant asked Jeff to leave. Id.
This was unusual because Jeff would "usually go in and say 'hello' to [defendant's] mother
and... father." Id. Jeff was "wondering what was going on," so that when he got home he
"checked under the passenger's seat." Id. He found a black box containing a set of scales
and some baggies. R.141:63, 109. Jeff was "so mad" that defendant would hide
"paraphernalia" in his truck that he "went straight to the police station." Id. When he arrived

2

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recited the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
3

at the police station, he gave Police Chief Adair the items defendant had hidden under the
seat. R. 141:63,109. Jeff also asked Chief Adair to search his truck; Chief Adair did so, but
found no other contraband. R.141:63, 110. After leaving the police station, Jeff found a
glass pipe under the seat, which he turned over to police. R. 141:64, 85.
Meanwhile, Officer Eberling and Agent Clark searched defendant. R.141:79,99-100.
Officer Eberling had come to defendant's house to question him about a hit and run accident.
R.141:79. Agent Clark accompanied Officer Eberling because he had been "having some
problem[s] with [defendant]," who had been "testing positive for methamphetamine."
R. 141:100. After searching defendant's bedroom and truck, they took defendant down to the
police station to question him regarding the hit-and-run accident and "possibly" to administer
a urinalysis test. R.141:79, 100.
As they pulled up to the police station, Chief Adair was across the street with Jeff,
searching his truck. R141:79, 124. Officer Eberling and Agent Clark took defendant into
the office. R141:79. While they were questioning defendant, Chief Adair knocked on the
door and handed Officer Eberling the items that Jeff had found under the seat in his truck.
R141:79, 100. Those items included a bag with a white crystal substance, a black box
containing a set of scales and a couple of small baggies, and a larger empty bag. R141:80,
100. Chief Adair explained that defendant had hidden these items under the passenger's seat
in Jeffs truck. R141:100.
After Chief Adair left, Officer Eberling and Agent Clark questioned defendant about
the contraband. Rl41:81, 101. Defendant first denied that the items belonged to him.
4

R141.-101, 126. Eventually, he admitted that the contraband was his. R141:81-82, 101.
Defendant told the officers that the white crystal substance was not methamphetamine, but
a cutting agent called "MSM." Rl41:81,101. Defendant explained that he was planning on
buying an ounce of methamphetamine, which he would mix with the cutting agent in order
to produce two ounces. Id. Then he could sell one ounce and keep the second ounce for
himself. Id. Subsequent testing of the white crystal substance confirmed that the white
substance was not methamphetamine. R141:86.
Defendant also told the officers that he used the scales to weigh the methamphetamine
he sold.

R141:102.

Defendant admitted that two of the baggies had contained

methamphetamine, which he had already used. Id. Both the baggies and the set of scales
tested positive for methamphetamine. R141:87.
At trial, defendant claimed that he did not attempt to hide anything in Jeffs truck and
that the contraband Jeff gave to Chief Adair did not belong to him. R141:122, 131.
Although defendant admitted to telling the officers that the contraband belonged to him, he
claimed to have done so only in an attempt to get Jeff off the hook. R141:129. Defendant
testified that he believed that the police had pulled Jeff over and found the contraband in his
truck. R141:127. Because defendant was already in trouble for violating his parole and
under investigation for a hit-and-run accident, he decided to take responsibility for the
contraband to protect Jeff. R141:127-28.

5

ARGUMENT
I
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT "THE STATE MUST ELIMINATE
ALL REASONABLE DOUBT" DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Defendant claims that the reasonable doubt instruction given at his trial violates the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See Br. Aplt. at 10. That reasonable
doubt instruction, in compliance with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997),
overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, informed the jury
that "[t]he State must "eliminate all reasonable doubt." R. 113 (addendum A). However,
after trial, the Utah Supreme Court "expressly abandoned]" the "'obviate all reasonable
doubt' element of the Robertson test." State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 30, 116 P.3d 305.
Relying on Reyes, defendant argues that the reasonable doubt instruction here created
a "substantial risk that a juror found [defendant] guilty based on a degree of proof below
beyond a reasonable doubt." Br. Aplt. at 13 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A.

Defendant's Reyes claim is unpreserved and does not arise under
"exceptional circumstances,"

Defendant's Reyes challenge is not properly before this Court. "As a general rule,
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, Tf 11, 10 P.3d 346. "Utah courts require specific objections in order to 'bring all
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to the give the court an opportunity to correct the
errors if appropriate.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ^ 14, 54 P.3d 645 (quoting State

6

v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993)). To preserve a claim, a defendant must
specify the alleged error so that the trial court can "'assess [the] allegations by isolating
relevant facts and considering them in the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at
issue.'" Id. at*i 15 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361). "[T]he preservation rule applies to
every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11.
The exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defined and applies primarily to rare
procedural anomalies." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993).
Defendant concedes that the issue he presses was not preserved by trial counsel. See
Br. Aplt. at 13. However, he argues that the fact that Reyes was not decided until after his
trial constitutes an exceptional circumstance excusing his failure to preserve the claim. See
Br. Aplt. at 13-14. In effect, he argues that he could not object at trial, because the basis for
his objection did not yet exist.
This very argument was rejected by the supreme court in State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d
1105 (Utah 1994). Lopez was tried for sex crimes against a child. On appeal, he argued that
a photo array was impermissibly suggestive under state due process principles announced in
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. At trial, Lopez had
not objected on this ground, as Ramirez had not yet been decided. Id. On appeal, the
supreme court had to "determine whether Lopez may now raise that issue on appeal." Id.
The court held that "Lopez cannot raise the issue of state due process for the first time on

7

appeal because he has not demonstrated that the 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances'
exceptions exist." Id.
The case at bar is indistinguishable. Nothing prevented defendant from challenging
the reasonable doubt instruction even before Reyes was decided. In Reyes itself, the State
argued that the Robertson three-part test was unconstitutional, despite the absence of any
authority declaring it unconstitutional. Moreover, here, the court of appeals, in an opinion
issued before defendant's trial, described the Robertson three-part test as "constitutionally
flawed" and "not consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent." See State v.
Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, If 22,30,84 P.3d 841. Nothing prevented defendant from preserving
his issue by making this argument at trial
This claim is thus barred.3
B.

Defendant's Reyes challenge fails because the prosecutor did not
argue that the State needed to refute only "doubts that are
sufficiently defined."

Defendant's claim lacks merit in any event. The due process danger identified in the
Reyes opinion did not arise here.
The reasonable doubt instruction given at trial, reproduced here in its entirety,
contained the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt":

3

Defendant does not claim that this Court can review his challenge to the reasonable
doubt instruction because the error was structural. See Br. Aplt. at 13-14. Whether failure
to object to a reasonable doubt instruction forecloses a claim of structural error is a question
the supreme court left unresolved in State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 18, 530 Utah Adv. Rep.
30.
8

A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the trial.
If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant
should be acquitted.
The state must eliminate all reasonable doubt Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is a
doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence.
Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to act
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the
evidence in the case.
R. 113 (emphasis added) (addendum A). For purposes of this appeal, the State does not
dispute defendant's assertion that "eliminate all reasonable doubt," the phrase employ ed here,
and "obviate all reasonable doubt," the phrase required by Robertson and rejected by Reyes,
are functionally equivalent.
The Reyes court found the "'obviate all reasonable doubt' concept" "[i]nsightfiil and
important," yet "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, % 26.
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor [v. Nebraska, 511
U.S. 1 (1994),] standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the
doubt against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation
of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an
ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it.

9

Id. at ^J 27. The court concluded, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate' test would
permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test
works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at ^J 28.
Reyes thus holds that the "obviate test" diminishes the State's constitutional burden
of proof only to the extent it would "permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts
that are sufficiently defined." Id. Consequently, where the State does not argue that it need
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the "obviate test" does not diminish the
State's constitutional burden.
Defendant here does not claim, nor does the record disclose, that the prosecutor
argued that the State need obviate only those doubts that are "sufficiently defined." See Br.
Aplt. at 10-14. Referring to the elements instruction, the prosecutor stated, "the State has
proven everything on this page beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 141: 165. In rebuttal she
stated that defense counsel's "job is to raise a reasonable doubt, and he's done the best job
he can, but he can't get over the hurdle of the State's evidence in this case." R. 141: 177.
She thus argued that the State's evidence foreclosed all reasonable doubt. She did not argue
that she need not refute any doubts because they were not "sufficiently defined." Reyes,
2005 UT 33,f28.
Defendant's claim fails for another reason. "[S]o long as the reasonable doubt
instructions, 'taken as a whole,... correctly convey [ ] the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury,' they pass constitutional muster." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,120,530 Utah Adv. Rep.
30 (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994)). "Simply put, [the court] need only
10

ask whether the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of
reasonable doubt, namely, that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime 'except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged."5 Id at f 21 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). In Cruz, the
supreme court approved a reasonable doubt instruction containing the sentence, "The law
does not require that the evidence dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it
dispel all reasonable doubt." Id. at f 11. In the context of reasonable doubt instructions,
"dispel," "obviate," and "eliminate" are synonyms. So in effect, the Cruz jury, like the jury
here, was told that the State must "eliminate all reasonable doubt." Yet the Supreme Court
approved the instruction.
The jury instructions here "pass constitutional muster" because, "taken as a whole,"
they "correctly convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury." Cruz, 2005 UT 45,
^f 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This concept was conveyed not only
by the reasonable doubt instruction quoted above, but also by others. See R. 107 ("In order
to obtain a conviction, the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt") ("If you believe that the state has proven each of these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty."); R. 108 ("If
there was enough methamphetamine to test, there was enough methamphetamine to possess,
provided the state proved all the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt").
In sum, even if defendant's claim were not waived, it fails on the merits.
11

II
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO HIS PRIOR CONVICTION
FAILS BECAUSE HE INVITED THE ALLEGED ERROR HE
CLAIMS ON APPEAL
Defendant claims that the judgment in his first conviction for possession was not final,
and therefore the prior conviction may not be used to enhance his present conviction. Aplt.
Br. at 15. In effect, defendant argues that because the judgment from his first conviction for
possession incorrectly stated that he pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute, the
judgment is of no effect. Id.
Following jury selection, defense counsel told the trial court that defendant, if found
guilty, would stipulate to the prior possession conviction that enhanced the current charge
from a third to a second degree felony. R.141:50-51. Defense counsel also explained that
the prior judgment contained an error. R .141:48-49. Specifically, the judgment stated that
defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute, whereas defendant in fact pled
guilty only to simple possession. R. 141:48. Defense counsel represented that the error was
simply clerical. Id. He further explained that he had discussed the discrepancy with
defendant and that defendant was still willing to stipulate to the prior conviction. R. 141:49.
Defense counsel then asked defendant, "Maybe we need to get that prior judgment amended;
but do you acknowledge that you do have a prior possession of a controlled substance
[conviction]?" Id. Defendant responded, "Yeah." Id. Defense counsel explained that he
"want[ed] to make a record of that. I just don't want that to be an appealable issue

12

somewhere down the road that [defendant is] saying that there was some type of—or making
some type of collateral attack on that original judgment." Id.
After the jury found defendant guilty, he stipulated to his previous possession
conviction. R. 141:183. Defendant then requested to be sentenced immediately. R. 141:185.
The trial court asked if there was "[a]ny legal reason why sentence should not be
pronounced?" R. 141:187. Defense counsel responded, "None, your Honor." Id. Thereafter,
the trial court ruled that defendant had been previously convicted of possession, which
enhanced the current conviction from a third degree to a second degree felony:
It's apparently conceded that the charge in case 9717-41 that the defendant
actually pled guilty to was possession of a controlled substance; and there was
just a clerical error in the judgment itself. He's—so he has clearly the
predicate previous offense to make this a second degree felony.
R.141:187-88. The trial court then sentenced defendant. R.141:188. Defense counsel then
asked the trial court if it would "consider an order—a motion at this time to amend the
judgment in the other case?" Id. The trial court responded, "I would hope that [the
prosecutor] would take care of that now." Id. She stated that she would. Id.4

4

According to the docketing statement for case number 9717-41, the judgment was
amended 12 October and 14 October 2004. See Docket Case Number 9717-41 at 4,
Addendum B.
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A.

Defendant invited any alleged error by stipulating to his
prior conviction.

This Court has "held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 n.20,
560-561 (Utah 1987) (notwithstanding plain error exception to preservation rule, invited
error viewed with disfavor and will operate to waive claim on appeal). A party invites error
by representing to the court that he or she has no objection to a proposed course of action.
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, «|[ 54, 70 P.3d 111 ("if counsel, either by statement or act,
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction,
we will not review the instruction under the manifest injustice exception").
Moreover, "where invited error butts up against manifest injustice, the invited error
rule prevails." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App.1991).
Defendant invited the alleged error he now complains of. Despite a clerical error in
the prior judgment, defendant twice stipulated that he had a prior convicted for possession.
Before the start of trial, defense counsel explained to the trial court that there was a clerical
error in defendant's prior judgment for possession of a controlled substance. R. 141: 48-49.
He further stated that he had discussed the error with defendant and that defendant was still
willing to stipulate to the prior conviction. Id. Instead of claiming that the error rendered
the judgment invalid, defendant stipulated to the prior conviction.

14

After the verdict, defendant again stipulated to his prior possession conviction.
R. 141:183.

Thereafter, defendant invited the trial court to impose sentence without

correcting the prior judgment. Further, when the trial court asked if there was any legal
reason why sentence should not be imposed, defense counsel responded, "None, your
Honor." R. 141:187. The reason for counsel's stance is obvious: whether the prior
conviction was for simple possession or possession with intent to distribute, it enhanced the
current offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(c) (West 2004).
In sum, defendant invited the alleged error he now complains of.
B.

The trial court did not commit error when it sentenced
defendant before the prior judgment was amended.

Even if this Court reaches defendant's claim, the trial court did not commit error.
As stated, defendant is essentially claiming that a final judgment with a clerical error
has no effect. Aplt. Br. at 15. According to Rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
"[cjlerical mistakes in judgments... may be corrected by the court at any time and after such
notice, if any, as the court may order." (emphasis added).

"A clerical error, as

contradistinguished from judicial error, is not 'the deliberate result of the exercise ofjudicial
reasoning and determination.'" State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) (quoting
State v. Mossman, 706 P.2d 203, 204 (Or. App. 1985) (additional quotation omitted). To
determine whether the mistake is a clerical one, this Court looks to the record "to harmonize
the intent of the [trial] court with the written judgment." Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389; State v.
Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 987-88 (Utah 1986).
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Once a court determines that a judgment contains a clerical error, it has the authority
to amend the judgment. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). The supreme court has described the
amending of a clerical error as nunc pro tunc. See Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298,299 (Utah
1984) ("Insofar as the correction of clerical errors is concerned, we have long recognized the
power of the courts . . . to do an act upon one date and make it effective as of a prior date so
that the record accurately reflects that which took place."); see generally State v. Johnson,
635 P.2d 36, 38 n.l (recognizing that action taken nunc pro tunc has a "retroactive" effect).
Thus, simply because a written judgment contains a clerical error, it does not render that
judgment of no effect. See Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co,, 579 P.2d 917, 918 (holding trial
court may correct clerical error after appellate court has affirmed trial court's decree).
Here, defense counsel explained that the mistake in the prior judgment was simply a
clerical error. R. 141:48. Following the trial, the trial court also agreed that the error in the
prior judgment was clerical. R. 141:187-88. Thereafter, the trial court stated that it hoped
that the prosecutor would amend the prior judgment. R. 141:18 8. The prosecutor stated that
she would. Id. Thus, all parties agreed that the error in the prior judgment was clerical. See
State v. Diviney, 2004 UT App 178, f 2, 2004 WL 1368190 (unpublished memorandum
decision) (judgment contained clerical error by stating that Diviney pled guilty to aggravated
burglary instead of simple burglary); Lawler v. State, 2002 UT App 437, Tf 3, 2002 WL
31875661 (unpublished memorandum decision) (judgment contained clerical error by stating
that Lawler was convicted of rape instead of forcible sexual abuse).5
5

In compliance with Utah R. App. P. 30(f), accurate copies of both Diviney and
Lawler are attached at Addendum C.
16

Therefore, contrary to defendant's assertion, clerical errors do not render a prior
judgment of no effect.
In addition, the trial court treated defendant's prior conviction as a conviction for
possession and not possession with intent to distribute. Thus, even if this Court held that the
trial court committed error, defendant suffered no prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18,
Tf 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the
bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). In the case
at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App.
P. 29(a)(3).
RESPECTFULLY submitted on &

September 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

U FREDERIC VORC
Assistant Attorney General
lef, Appeals Division
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Addenda

Addendum A

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

t

A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

throughout the trial.

This

presumption

follows

the

defendant

If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond

a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
The state must eliminate ^(reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy,
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince
the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough
to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that
reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the
case.

Addendum B

7TH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. ERIC HALLS
CASE NUMBER 971700041 State Felony

CHARGES
58-37-8(1AII)
Charge 1
(amended)
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: May 16,
Charge 2 - 58-37-8(1AII)
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: May 16,
Charge 3 - 58-37-8(1AII)
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: May 16,

- DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO'DIST C/S
Plea: May 16, 1997 Guilty
1997 {Guilty Plea}
- DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S
1997 Dismissed
- DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S
1997 Dismissed

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
LYLE R. ANDERSON
PARTIES
Defendant - ERIC HALLS
DRAPER, UT
Represented by: WILLIAM L SCHULTZ
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Represented by: WILLIAM L BENGE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: ERIC HALLS
Offense tracking number: 9002643
Date of Birth: November 22, 1977
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY ATTORNEY
Prosecuting Agency: SAN JUAN COUNTY
Violation Date: April 15, 1996
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:

2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00

2.00
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CASE NUMBER 971700041 State Felony

Amount P a i d :
lount C r e d i t :
Balance:

2.00
0.00
0.00

CASE NOTE
***UTAH STATE PRISONER***
PROCEEDINGS
02-19-97 Information filed
02-19-97 Initial Appearance scheduled on March 20, 1997 at 09:31 AM in
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON.
02-20-97 Note: Update: Gave Mark Ewart Order to Produce Prisoner to
forward to prison
03-20-97 Minute Entry - Initial Appearance
Judge:
LYLE R. ANDERSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
SHELLY BROWN
Prosecutor: WILLIAM L. BENGE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ
Audio
Tape Number:

7-50

Tape Count: 780

INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
Defendant advised of charges and penalties.
Case recalled 50/1523. Defendant demanded a preliminary hearing.
03-20-97 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on May 16, 1997 at 01:30 PM in
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON.
03-21-97 Filed: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR COURT APPOINTED
COUNSEL-APPOINTED
03-24-97 Filed: ORDER TO PRODUCE PRISONER W/CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
03-27-97 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF THE SERVICE OF THE REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
04-02-97 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE WITH SUBPOENA
Party Served: LYLE BAYLAS
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: March 31, 1997
04-02-97 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE WITH SUBPOENA
Party Served: C I 108
Service Type: Substitute
Service Date: March 31, 1997
04-02-97 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE WITH SUBPOENA
Party Served: C I 109
Service Type: Substitute
Service Date: March 31, 1997
05-13-97 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on May 16, 1997 at 01:29 PM in
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CASE NUMBER 971700041 State Felony

COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON.
05-15-97 Change of Plea scheduled on May 16, 1997 at 01:29 PM in
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON.
05-15-97 Preliminary Hearing Cancelled scheduled for: 5/16/97
05-16-97 Charge 1 amended
05-16-97 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty Plea
05-16-97 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed
05-16-97 Charge 3 Disposition is Dismissed
05-16-97 Minute Entry - Arraignment
Judge:
LYLE R. ANDERSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
shellyb
Prosecutor: WILLIAM L. BENGE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ
Audio
Tape Number:

97-97

Tape Count: 5958

ARRAIGNMENT
Defendant advised of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives preliminary hearing.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
Defendant has 30 days to withdraw his plea of guilty. The state
consents to the waiving of the preliminary hearing.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SAN JUAN County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Defendant is to serve this sentence concurrent with any other
prison sentences.
Defendant is remanded to the custody of the prison. All parties
signed the defendant's statement.
05-16-97 Filed: STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
05-28-97 Filed order: ORDER Preliminary Hearing Waived
Judge landerso
Signed May 27, 1997
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05-28-97 Filed judgment: FINDINGS, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT W/CERTIFICATE
OF MAILING
Judge landerso
Signed May 16, 1997
03-11-98 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.00
03-11-98 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
2.00
Note: Mail Payment
10-12-04 Filed order: AMENDED JUDGMENT AND C OMMITMENT TO UJTAH STATE
PRISON
Judge janderso
Signed October 12, 2004
10-14-04 Filed order: SECOND AMENDEDJUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH
STATE PRISON
Judge janderso
Signed October 14, 2004
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Not Reported in P.3d5 2004 WL 1368190 (Utah AppO, 2004 UT App 178
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1368190 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Charles Lee DIVINEY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20020220-CA.
June 4, 2004.
Third District, Salt Lake
Honorable Sheila K. McCleve.

Department;

The

Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, JACKSON, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
ORME, Judge:
*1 We have determined that M[t]he facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs
and record[,] and the decisional process would not
be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah
R.App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented
are readily resolved under applicable law.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) provides
that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any
time." In addition, "clerical errors
... may be corrected at any time." State v. Lorrah,
761 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Utah 1988). Defendant
alleges, and the State agrees, that the trial court
committed a clerical error when it entered a
judgment, sentence, and commitment that

reflected Defendant pled guilty to aggravated
burglary, when Defendant was actually charged
with and pled guilty to simple burglary. We agree
that a clerical error was made by the trial court,
and, therefore, in order "to harmonize the intent
of the [trial] court with the written judgment," id.
at 1389, we remand to the trial court for entry of a
corrected judgment to reflect Defendant's guilty
plea to burglary rather than aggravated burglary.
Defendant raises several issues regarding the
restitution award, the first of which pertains to the
calculation of lost wages. According to Defendant's
recalculation, with which the State agrees, the
victim should only have been awarded $1,978.25 in
lost wages. Therefore, we remand so the trial court
can adjust the restitution amount accordingly.
Next, Defendant argues that the victim was
improperly compensated for lost wages on
"charge-off days. The victim testified that she
could have worked at both jobs on charge-off days,
and, therefore, that she is entitled to compensation
for lost wages from the school district because, due
to the injuries she suffered, she was unable to work
at the school district on such days. Defendant points
out that, prior to the injuries, the victim never
worked both jobs on charge-off days and even after
her recovery, she never worked both jobs on such
days.
Section 76-3-201 defines restitution as "full, partial
or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim" of criminal activity, Utah Code Ann. §
76-3- 201(l)(d) (2003), and pecuniary damages as
"all special damages, but not general damages." Id. §
76-3-201(l)(c). But see State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT
App 417,HH 19-28, 82 P.3d 211 (Orme, J.,
concurring). Special damages consist of "actual loss
of past earnings and anticipated loss of future
earnings." Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-411(4)(d)
(Supp.2003). In seeking compensable damages, the
victim must show that a loss has actually occurred.

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 1368190 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 178
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See Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc.,
944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 1997). The State failed to
prove that the victim ever actually worked on
charge-off days at the school district either before
the incidents involving Defendant or after her
recovery. Based on her actual work history, the
victim is not entitled to recover lost wages from the
school district on charge-off days. The trial court is
instructed to make the appropriate adjustment on
remand.
*2 Defendant's other restitution claims were not
preserved for appeal and need not be reached. Rule
24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires that Defendant cite "to the
record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court." Although Defendant did cite to the
record where he objected to the restitution in
general and to certain specific items included in the
restitution award, Defendant failed to specifically
object to the July 18, 2001 lost wages, the alarm
system installation at her son's house, and the
quarterly payments due on both alarm systems
following the first incident. "Generally, a defendant
who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is
barred from asserting it initially on appeal." State v.
Archambeau,
820 P.2d
920,
922
(Utah
Ct.App.1991). See also Harris v. IES Assocs., 2003
UT App 112^ 51, 69 P.3d 297 (holding that
"general reference[s] to the trial transcript volumes"
are insufficient to satisfy the requirement of rule
24(a)(5)(A)).
We remand to the trial court to correct the clerical
error to reflect Defendant's guilty plea to burglary
and to adjust the amount of restitution as specified
herein. Otherwise, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Judge.
END OF DOCUMENT
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sylvester LAWLER, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee.
No. 20011006-CA.
Dec. 27, 2002.
Third District, Salt Lake
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs.

Department;

The

Sylvester Lawler, Draper, Appellant Pro Se.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, BENCH, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:
*1 Appellant Sylvester Lawler appeals the denial
of his petition for post-conviction relief.
Lawler was charged with one count each of rape
and forcible sodomy, both first degree felonies.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to a
single count of forcible sexual abuse, a second
degree felony. Approximately one month before the
change of plea, Lawler's retained counsel moved to
withdraw on the basis that Lawler was unable to pay
him. The district court denied the motion, and
Lawler's retained counsel continued to represent
him through entry of the guilty plea, conviction, and
sentencing. The district court conducted a detailed
examination at the change of plea hearing during
which Lawler expressed his satisfaction with
counsel's representation and his belief that the plea

was in his best interest and was not motivated by his
counsel's financial concerns.
In the petition for post-conviction relief, Lawler
claimed that (1) he received ineffective assistance
and his counsel had a conflict of interest; (2) his
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; and (3)
the written judgment and sentence incorrectly stated
that he was convicted of rape. Although the original
judgment contained a clerical error made in
reducing the sentence to a written judgment, the
court amended the judgment to correctly reflect a
conviction of forcible sexual abuse, rather than
rape. The court sent the corrected judgment and
sentence to Lawler and to the Board of Pardons.
Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed
as moot the claim that Lawler was convicted of, or
sentenced for, the wrong offense.
The district court concluded, based upon review of
the record in the original criminal proceeding, that
trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance
and the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. The
detailed plea colloquy fully explored and disposed
of any claim that Lawler was dissatisfied with his
legal representation. This included Lawler's
admission that he believed the guilty plea was in his
best interest and was not motivated by counsel's
financial concerns. In addition, the negotiated plea
was clearly advantageous because Lawler had
confessed to having sexual intercourse with, and
sodomizing, the minor victim, which was also
supported by physical evidence.
Lawler's post-conviction claim that he was offered,
and believed that he had accepted, a negotiated plea
bargain that would have allowed him to plea guilty
to two third degree felonies was not supported by
the trial court record. The plea colloquy and
statement of defendant clearly set forth the offense
to which Lawler pleaded guilty and negated the
existence of any other promises. The district court
correctly concluded that the record demonstrated
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Lawler understood the plea that he ultimately
entered.
Finally, the district court correctly rejected a
post-conviction claim that the psychosexual
evaluation of Lawler was inaccurate because it did
not challenge the conviction or sentence.
*2 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial
of post-conviction relief.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2002 WL 31875661 (Utah
App.), 2002 UT App 437
END OF DOCUMENT
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